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sealed since 18 Nov 2026 (UTC)
Troya seals what it decides in public. Today that is every Gate API check (paid over x402 and Virtuals ACP too), Council verdict, red Aegis alert, Arena strategy and trade, and Sentry call on The Record, plus Ring Radar flags, Watchfire fires, Oaths taken and broken, War Table callouts, Owl journals and the public randomness draws. A receipt is signed twice, by the Troya attestor (ECDSA) and with a post-quantum ML-DSA-65 key, and chained to the one before it. Once a day the chain is anchored on Robinhood Chain, so a closed day cannot be rewritten, by Troya or anyone else.
Read straight from /api/seal. Each receipt opens as JSON with its own check: the hash, both signatures and the link to the receipt before it.
sealed since 18 Nov 2026 (UTC)
receipts so far today (UTC)
one hash that commits the whole history
the day's last hash, written on Robinhood Chain
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Troya's three contracts on Robinhood Chain, TroyaFeeSplitterFactory 0x2663…F525, TroyaPass 0x439E…a77E and TroyaOathVault 0x6Bb9…a4e8, were checked with Halmos, a16z's symbolic prover. A fuzz test tries random values; Halmos proves each property for all of them. Run it yourself: uvx --python 3.12 halmos --match-path 'test/halmos/*' in the repo's contracts folder. These are proofs of the listed properties, not a claim that the code has no other bugs.
For any amount and any allowed share, the treasury gets exactly amount × share ÷ 10,000, the creator gets the rest, and nothing stays behind.
No splitter can ever be created with a share above 2,000 basis points.
Nobody, Troya included, can re-initialize a splitter to a new creator or share.
Changing where Troya's share goes never changes the creator, the share, or what the creator receives.
Any other caller trying to change the treasury fails, and nothing changes.
If a creator cannot receive ETH, the amount is kept for them. Only they can withdraw it, and it is never split again.
A pass mints only for a wallet holding at least 1,000,000 $TROYA, and always to that wallet.
A second mint always fails, whatever the balance.
No transfer path moves a pass: not by its holder, not by anyone else, to any address.
approve and setApprovalForAll always fail, so nobody can ever be allowed to move a pass.
Anyone else's burn changes nothing; the holder's burn removes the pass.
Before a lock's cliff, every withdrawal fails, whatever amount is asked.
A withdrawal never takes more than the daily rate has unlocked by then, so a dev can never sell faster than its Oath allows.
Only the wallet the coins are locked for can take them out or change the terms. The vault has no owner and no admin.
After any change, the cliff is no earlier and the daily rate no higher than before.
Everything taken out of a lock, over two withdrawals at any times, stays within what was locked, and the vault always holds exactly the rest.
ECDSA keys like every Ethereum wallet's are expected to be breakable by a large enough quantum computer one day. Each receipt therefore also carries an ML-DSA-65 signature (NIST FIPS 204), a post-quantum scheme, so the record stays checkable either way. Quantum-Ready, not quantum-proof: Robinhood Chain itself, like every EVM chain, still runs on ECDSA.
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Paste a receipt's JSON. Troya recomputes the hash, checks the ECDSA signature against the attestor, checks the ML-DSA signature against the key above, and looks up the receipt it points to.